An American study detailing Saudi Arabia's deterrence options against Iran (translation)
English - Monday 28 August 2023 الساعة 03:44 pm
NewsYemen, special translation:
Recently, a long American study was published that dealt with the current development of Saudi-Iranian relations, focusing mainly on the options available to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to deter security threats from Iran and its proxies in the Arab region, especially the Houthi group in Yemen.
The study, issued Sunday, August 27, by the Middle East Institute for Studies and Policy Analysis, and translated by "Newsyemen", touched on several key points that represent challenges and options in front of economic development and securing its implementation through Vision 2030. Where the author of the study, Bilal Saab, said, it is among all the challenges Facing Saudi Vision 2030, there may be no greater threat to Saudi national security than Iran. To succeed, Saudi Arabia must not only strengthen its defenses against further Iranian and Houthi attacks, but also establish a level of deterrence against Tehran.
He added that Riyadh has three main deterrence options, which are not mutually exclusive: 1) diplomacy; 2) external protection. and 3) more effective military capabilities.
The study indicated that the diplomatic option remains largely deficient due to the deep contradiction in threat perceptions and goals between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, diplomacy is perhaps Riyadh's best bet at present to maintain calm and achieve deterrence.
It stated that Saudi Arabia could obtain formal security guarantees from an external ally to prevent Iran from attacking it again. The two candidates that could play this role are the United States and possibly China. However, Saudi Arabia's chances of securing a formal defense agreement from China or the United States are not good, although the prospect of enhanced security cooperation with the United States increases.
The study indicated that in order to maintain peace in the long term, Saudi Arabia must develop more effective military capabilities, and described Riyadh's determination to strengthen its deterrent position by developing ballistic missile capabilities as risky.
It noted that Washington may not be able to prevent Saudi Arabia from expanding its influence and obtaining more powerful ballistic missiles, but through an entirely new approach to military cooperation, it can help Riyadh develop its other military capabilities.
Security is paramount
The study stated that security is an integral part of the economic restructuring in Saudi Arabia, especially on such a huge scale. And in the event that the kingdom suffers another major conventional strike, such as the one that occurred in September 2019, when Iran launched 25 drones and cruise missiles against Saudi oil processing facilities.
It added that Saudi estimates considered the Houthi takeover of power to be a more serious threat to its national security due to the Houthi militia's direct and growing links with Iran, as the latter is arming the Houthis with advanced weapons, including drones and missiles, and in return, the Houthis allow Iran to expand its influence in the region. The Red Sea, a vital link in a network of global waterways of great importance to the global economy.
Having seen how Tehran institutionalized its influence in places like Lebanon and Iraq through local proxies, Saudi Arabia feared a similar Iranian outpost was nearby. To prevent this from happening, Prince Mohammed bin Salman waged war against the Houthis, initially with the help of an Arab coalition from the Middle East and parts of North Africa. But with the Houthis still in control of the bulk of Yemen's northern highlands as well as the capital Sana'a, a mutually damaging military stalemate between the Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni forces led to a truce in April 2022 under the auspices of the United Nations. While the agreement expired in October 2022 after being extended twice, the ceasefire has largely held. However, despite this, the Houthis still have their heavy weapons, which means that they still pose a security threat to Saudi Arabia.
Diplomacy
The study indicated that deterrence through diplomacy is an ancient concept in the history of wars between nations, and it is a much less expensive tool than war, and if used properly, it can be very effective. She said that the research of experts in international relations indicates that deterrence can be achieved through the transmission of information that the state is ready to fight over a disputed issue or issues.
The study cited the dynamic of the war between Egypt and Israel in the 1970s, when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat realized that confronting the security threat posed by Israel and restoring the Sinai Peninsula could not be achieved through military means alone (nor through US mediation alone). So he went to Jerusalem in November 1977, met with Israeli leaders, and boldly declared "no more war" in the Israeli Knesset to reassure the Jewish state about Egypt's peaceful intentions. The author of the study asked: Will Saudi Arabia be able to achieve lasting peace with Iran through a historical gesture such as the Sadat initiative?
He said that Iran may not feel threatened by Saudi military capabilities or intentions, but it is concerned that Saudi Arabia may provide a platform for US or Israeli military operations against Iran, and therefore the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic agreement that includes a commitment not to allow the Saudis to use their lands in military operations. carried out by a third party that would be of value to the Iranians. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Iran, due to the simple fact that Iran has extensive military capabilities that it used offensively in September 2019, while its Yemeni arm (the Houthis) launched hundreds of attacks from Yemen against Saudi Arabia.
The author of the study added that this deep contradiction in threat perceptions and goals between Saudi Arabia and Iran does not lead to a fruitful security dialogue. In the absence of consistency on issues and a certain level of mutual vulnerability, it is difficult to see meaningful breakthroughs in the Saudi-Iranian dialogue, noting that until recently, Riyadh did not participate in formal negotiations with Tehran to address its security concerns, and that Saudi Arabia has always considered that talking with an opponent to it A track record of aggression and bad intentions is futile. The author of the study cited a statement by Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan in February 2020 when asked if Saudi Arabia would engage in talks with Iran, giving the same answer given by many of his predecessors: “Our message to Iran is to change its behavior first before discussing anything. […] Until we can talk about the real sources of this instability, the conversation will be fruitless.”
And as Saudi Arabia subsequently struggled to end its costly war in Yemen, and as it watched the United States withdraw combat forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and limit its military involvement across the region, Saudi Arabia's calculus over negotiations with Iran began to shift.
He touched on the beginning of talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran in April 2021, in Baghdad on a range of issues, including, in particular, Tehran's military support for the Houthis, and how the two parties reached the announcement of the normalization of their diplomatic relations under the auspices of China in March 2023 after five rounds of talks within two years. .
As of this writing, he said, more than five months have passed since the signing of the Saudi-Iranian agreement, but no one knows what agreements, if any, Riyadh and Tehran reached regarding security. There is language in the bilateral agreement regarding non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region, but it is general and non-binding.
With regard to Yemen, for example, the writer said that it is not clear whether Iran is legally obligated to stop its military operations and aid to the Houthis, even though it has agreed to stop secret arms shipments to the Houthis as part of its diplomatic agreement with Saudi Arabia, but in fact, She didn't. He referred to the statement of the US Special Envoy to Yemen, Tim Linderking, last May, that Iran continued to supply the Houthis with weapons and drugs.
He explained that the April 2022 armistice agreement could be violated at any moment if the Houthis decided to expand their control and regional attacks, and that ambiguity still surrounds Iran's ability to prevent the Houthis from launching new attacks against Saudi civilian targets.
Saudi Arabia's primary demand for rapprochement with Iran is to stop further attacks against the kingdom, either directly or through its regional proxies. Iran, for its part, wants money from Saudi Arabia to alleviate its deep economic problems. Indeed, Iran is seeking Saudi and possibly Gulf Arab money to prop up an economy that has been a source of widespread social unrest. Iran also wants Saudi Arabia to stop funding anti-Iranian media networks and return its ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, to the Arab League, which Riyadh has done.
While Tehran's lure of normalization, economic investments, and diplomatic acceptance of the Assad government might bring temporary calm, it is unlikely to change the strategic environment or eliminate Saudi fears of Iran. This Saudi strategy smacks of appeasement more than effective diplomacy.
And the study continued: There are reasons that make us less optimistic about the length of the current calm between Saudi Arabia and Iran. First, Iran is unlikely to sever its military ties with the Houthis, because that would deny it a strategic foothold in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a critical global sea lane that controls access to the Red Sea.
Second, Iran is unlikely to stop seizing commercial tankers in Gulf waters, as it sees its actions as a response to the occasional seizure of Iranian oil shipments by the United States. And third, it is doubtful that Iran would stop supporting its hard-line allies in Lebanon and Iraq, and would suddenly respect the sovereignty of these two countries. This would greatly contradict Iranian ideology and decades of foreign policy practice in the Arab world. Fourth, the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the one hand, and Iran on the other, over the offshore Dorra natural gas field is likely to escalate. The Kuwaitis said that they and the Saudis exclusively own the natural wealth in the Gulf region. The maritime "divided area", while the Iranians claimed that they have a share in it, and described the Saudi-Kuwaiti agreement signed last year to develop it as "illegal".
External protection
The study stated that Saudi Arabia is not oblivious to the limits of diplomacy with Iran, which is why it has not put all its eggs in one basket to achieve deterrence against its arch-rival. Saudi Arabia can obtain formal security guarantees from the United States or China.
The study did not address the agreement announced last week between China and Saudi Arabia to build a nuclear plant for the latter. Although the nature of the nuclear plant may be for peaceful purposes, Saudi Arabia's acquisition of it will make it easier for it to benefit from it militarily.
While the study stated that China will not choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran, because it relies on both of them to obtain large oil imports, it indicated that America also may not risk a military confrontation with Iran for the sake of Saudi Arabia, despite the possibility of a barter deal in this direction between America and Saudi Arabia. If the latter accepts the normalization of its relations with Israel, under which it could obtain formal security guarantees from Washington amounting to expanded official deterrence and assistance in establishing a domestic civilian nuclear program.
more effective military capabilities
The study indicated that regardless of Saudi Arabia obtaining the necessary external protection for its national security, there is no alternative to building deterrence and self-defense capabilities at home, and this is the first rule for survival in international relations, especially in dangerous environments such as the Middle East, which is what Saudi Arabia does.
It added that no Saudi leader since the founding of the Kingdom has been more determined to reform the Saudi defense establishment and the armed forces than Mohammed bin Salman. Whether he will succeed, or whether he is biting off more than he can chew is a separate matter, but the vision, plan and effort are all there.
The challenge for the Saudi defense transition, like any other such process elsewhere, is that, because it is comprehensive, it will take many years before it has a tangible impact on national defense.Saudi Arabia is not just buying new military equipment, as it used to do, but it is investing in rules, standards, processes and procedures that form a sound defense foundation, things it hasn't been doing before. Saudis today are also learning how to set up and manage human resources systems. how to do better budgeting and accounting; how to reduce waste and corruption; how to operate logistics; how to formulate strategies and doctrine; how to establish the chain of command; how to train more effectively; how to strengthen the joints; how to build professional intelligence systems; how to conduct planning; And how to do the acquisition correctly.Essentially, they are trying to achieve the most difficult task facing any aspiring military power: turning their defense budget into a real fighting force. Indeed, as Vision 2030 correctly demonstrates, everything is interconnected. Building a new Saudi army requires building a new Saudi society and a new Saudi economy. This, in short, is what Mohammed bin Salman's grand plan revolves around.
