Analysis: Al-Budaiwi reveals the priorities of the Gulf countries... Why did the Yemeni crisis come third?
English - Thursday 20 July 2023 الساعة 04:21 pm
Aden, NewsYemen, exclusive:
The Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Muhammad Jassim Al-Budaiwi, said that the Houthis' intransigence is the reason for the continuation of the crisis in Yemen, noting that the Houthi militia's intransigence is represented in their lack of seriousness in "engaging in a serious dialogue."
Al-Budaiwi spoke in an interview with Al-Jazeera channel on Wednesday, expressing the Gulf Cooperation Council's readiness to help the Yemenis achieve a political settlement "if they have a serious desire."
Through Al-Budaiwi's speech, the Gulf countries at the current stage focus all their efforts on what he called: "economic integration" among them, the situation in Sudan and Yemen, relations with Iran, and the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
These five priorities of the Arab Gulf states are what preoccupy their leaders at this stage, and their arrangement according to Al-Budaiwi’s hadith reveals the priority of each issue compared to the other, but all five issues seem to be interconnected as links in a chain. The war that has been raging for nearly a decade in more than one Arab country has exhausted the Gulf states economically, and it is expected that their economy will be given number one among the priorities, in parallel with the endeavor to calm the situation in Yemen and Sudan - the latest hotspots in the region - after they have made strides in calming the situation in Syria and support its return to the Arab League.
Yemeni crisis channels
From a practical point of view, the Yemeni crisis is currently proceeding through ramified regional and international channels and lines. The most prominent of these channels is the Omani mediation, which worked to bring the Houthis and Saudi Arabia closer together, after playing a completely undisclosed role in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement that China sponsored last March. Through the same channel, Saudi Arabia sought rapprochement with the Houthis last April, but the results of the Saudi diplomatic delegation's visit to Sana'a, accompanied by an Omani delegation, were not satisfactory to Saudi Arabia.
This is evidenced by the retreat of Riyadh after that visit and the focus of its priority on building its economy in integration with the rest of the Gulf countries and the major global economies, most notably China and Japan, whose prime minister visited Riyadh this week as part of a Gulf tour.
The second channel through which the Yemeni crisis passes is represented by the international mediation efforts, and this channel is linked to the interests of the major countries in Yemen, most notably the United States of America, Britain and the countries of the European Union. Within this channel, the will of international interests struggle in an undisclosed manner, often in the context of the Yemeni crisis. However, this conflict reveals itself in the heated international events, the most prominent of which embodies the Russian-Ukrainian war and its complex network of alliances.
As for the third channel, which is the most important, it is represented by the complex conflict between the Yemeni parties themselves. A large part of the roots of this conflict is not given the attention it deserves by regional and international powers, especially the countries that support the legitimate government. And while Iran supports the Houthis in their sectarian project and provides them with international political and diplomatic support, the Arab coalition countries are pressuring the anti-Houthi parties to accept a settlement based on political partnership with them, regardless of the ill health of their project, its sectarian character, and its dynastic nature.
While the Houthi militia surrounds any internal disputes within it within the conflict of the wings with complete secrecy, Iran helps it contain any signs of conflict and tip the balance of its loyalists without the need to summon the leaders of the conflict to Tehran. On the contrary, disputes are managed in the republican ranks within the legitimate government, and these disputes are still reproducing since the beginning of the military intervention of the Arab coalition and are announced, whether in the media or through armed confrontations, without warning of the consequences of this on the popular bases of each party. Consequently, the ongoing conflict in this channel appears exposed to all those who want to escalate it, and difficult to calm down to those who want to contain it.
The consequences of the exposed conflict
The disagreements of the Republican camp seem more complicated than being contained by the parties wishing to unite the ranks or by the coalition countries, which have recently tended to shift their priorities towards their internal problems and their relations with the countries of the region, especially Iran and Turkey, and towards balancing their international alliances in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This shift in the arrangement of the Gulf neighboring countries' priorities is one of the consequences of the open conflict between the anti-Houthi forces and their lack of awareness of their priorities over the past eight years. And after the Yemeni crisis occupied the highest priority for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it has become in the third degree, and more discrepancies within the Republican ranks could lead to a reversal of attention towards the tenth degree.
